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Disability Rights and The Louisiana  
Constitution 
 
by DEREK WARDEN* 
 
The Louisiana Constitution contains three Equal Protection Clauses.  Ar-
ticle I, section 3 prohibits discriminatory laws; but, as an original matter, 
should prohibit both discriminatory laws and government conduct.  Article 
I, section 12 prohibits discrimination by individuals (government or private) 
in regard to access to public places.  Finally, article I, section 2, the Due 
Process Clause, also contains an Equal Protection component.  Each clause 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of “physical condition,” which contains 
a general “disability” component.  Based upon statements from the Louisiana 
Constitutional Convention and other modalities of constitutional argument, 
this article concludes that these clauses—individually and in conjunction—
contain prohibitions on the following forms of disability discrimination: dis-
parate treatment, failure to make reasonable accommodations or modifica-
tions, disparate impact, and failure to integrate or “unjustified institutionali-
zation.”  Realizing such components of the State Constitution could have 
significant and broad impacts—ranging from issues relating to accessible 




The Constitution of Louisiana is an awe-inspiring document.  Its provi-
sions often resemble a civil code1 and the Constitution of the United States.  
Its Declaration of Rights is the fraternal twin of the federal Bill of Rights and 
contains many of the same provisions.  Nonetheless, the Louisiana Constitu-
tion goes further in the protection of individual rights than does the United 
 
 * Law Clerk to Associate Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Honorable Piper Griffin.  
I received my J.D. and D.C.L. from LSU Paul M Hebert Law Center in 2016.  I earned an L.L.M. 
from Tulane Law School in 2020.  Currently, I’m an S.J.D. candidate at Tulane Law School.  A 
special thank you is given to Dean David Meyer of Tulane Law School and Professor Margaret S. 
Thomas of LSU Law. I am very grateful to the staff of Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for 
their amazing work on this paper.  The views expressed herein are my own. 
 1. The same can be said of a number of constitutions, including that of the United States. 
Derek Warden, Secundum Civilis: The Constitution as an Enlightenment Code, 8 J. CIV. L. STUD. 
586 (2015). 
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States Constitution.  Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court has not been shy 
about recognizing unwritten rights and using a multi-clausal approach to dis-
cover such expanded constitutional rights.2  This power and interpretive 
method are no longer controversial.  In fact, the people of Louisiana have 
acquiesced to this expansive approach by adopting the somewhat controver-
sial Amendment One, which purports to prevent this method of analysis from 
being used to discover an unwritten right to abortion.3  If this method were 
not legitimate or the discovery of unwritten rights not within the courts’ pow-
ers, one would be hard pressed to answer why the people felt such an amend-
ment is necessary. 
In any event, while the Louisiana Supreme Court has no doubt found 
unwritten and expansive rights within the confines of the Louisiana Consti-
tution, it has also read several textual provisions more broadly than their 
counterpart in the federal Constitution.  Primary examples of this broad ap-
proach are found in our state’s Equal Protection Clauses.  These clauses con-
tain something not found in the federal Constitution—a sort of heightened 
protection for people with disabilities.4  Upon first discovering these clauses, 
I wrote a short article examining one potential relationship between federal 
disability rights laws and the Louisiana Constitution.5  The question that was 
born by that article was this: how far does this relationship go? 
This article seeks to answer that question inasmuch as a single law re-
view article could answer such a question.  Using well accepted modalities 
of constitutional interpretation,6 I conclude that several aspects of federal 
disability rights laws are part of the Louisiana Constitution.  In short, I con-
clude that, in respect to persons with disabilities, the Louisiana Constitution 
now prohibits state and local entities (and to a similar extent private entities) 
from committing acts of disparate treatment; acts with disparate impacts; 
failures to make reasonable accommodations, modification, and physical al-
terations; and contains an integration requirement, which also prohibits 
 
 2.  See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992). 
 3. LA. H.R. 447, Reg. Sess. (LA. 2019) (enacted).  This added article I § 20.1 to the Louisiana 
Constitution.  Article I § 20.1 states, “nothing in the constitution shall be construed to secure or 
protect a right to abortion or require the funding of abortion; to provide for submission of the pro-
posed amendment to the electors; and to provide for related matters.” 
 4. See Albright v. Southern Trace Country Club of Shreveport, 879 So. 2d 121, 134 (La. 
2004). 
 5. Derek Warden, Decals and Discrimination: Accessible Parking Tags, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, and the Louisiana Constitution, 11 J. RACE GENDER AND POV. 1 (2020). 
 6. These are (1) historical, which means looking to history to determine what the framers or 
ratifiers thought; (2) textual, looking at the text of the document itself; (3) doctrinal, looking for 
rules from precedents; (4) structural, looking at the structure of the constitution and the structures 
it sets up; (5) prudential, weighing the costs associated with the right (this will happen when dis-
cussing the interests of the state below); and (6) American ethos, which focuses on looking at who 
we are as a society and what we regularly do.  PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991).  I note these interpretation tools here to say that they will be used 
throughout my article, but I will not undertake to identify each one as they arise. 
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unjustified institutionalization of persons with disabilities. 
To set forth this argument, this article will be divided as follows.  Part I 
will discuss the history of disability rights.  Part II will then define “disabil-
ity” for purposes of the Louisiana Constitution.  Part III will examine the 
disparate treatment theory under the Louisiana Constitution.  Part IV will 
examine the disparate impact theory under the Louisiana Constitution.  Part 
V will examine the reasonable accommodations and alterations portion of 
the Louisiana Constitution.  Part VI will examine why the Louisiana Consti-
tution prohibits unjustified institutionalization of persons with disabilities.  
Finally, Part VII will discuss and respond to various objections to the argu-
ments made in this article. 
 
I. Historical Setting 
 
 A. In General 
 
 As is often noted, the history of disability rights is filled with terror, tor-
ment and tragedy, while simultaneously providing the greatest examples of 
hope and healing.  Justice Thurgood Marshall famously summarized this his-
tory of disability discrimination in his Cleburne dissent.7  What is most no-
table about the history of disability discrimination, as opposed to all others, 
is that disability discrimination arose most often from neglect, indifference, 
and disparate impact rather than from ill will or animus.8 
 I begin the discussion of history long ago.  In pre-history, our human 
ancestors often accommodated those with impairments, such as individuals 
who had fought in wars or were born with serious physical illnesses.9  This 
type of compassionate treatment is ingrained in human consciousness, 
though we have at times ignored it.  The ancient Greeks condemned those 
with physical disabilities to death at infancy,10 and Aristotle was known to 
have called for the execution of children with disabilities.11 
 During the Middle Ages, and until the Enlightenment, those with disa-
bilities were treated as being possessed, held positions of power, or even be-
came saints once abandoned by their families.12  Seeking to provide some 
 
 7. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 462 (1985) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
 8. Derek Warden, Methods of Administration, 10 HOUS. L. REV.: OFF RECORD 39, 53 
(2020). 
 9. Andrew Curry, Ancient Bones Offer Clues to How Long Ago Humans Cared for Vulner-
able, NPR, https://www.npr.org/section/goatsandsoda/2020/06/17/878896481/ancient-bones-of-
fer-clues-to-how-long-ago-humans-cared-for-the-vulnerable (last visited Nov. 12, 2020). 
 10. John F. Muller, Disability, Ambivalence, and The Law, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 469, 482 
(2011). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Warden, supra note 8, at 43. 
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service for those who needed it, England recognized the royal prerogative, 
which solidified the right to protect those with impairments in the Crown.13  
This power, however, would soon be used for great evil. 
 The Monarchy’s power of parens patriae was transferred to the States 
of the United States; and with this power, the States began to house individ-
uals with disabilities in massive mental health asylums.14  These places are 
too numerous to list in this article, however, suffice it to say that among the 
worst were: Willowbrook State School, Bridgewater Hospital, and Pennhurst 
State School.15  Many patients were killed, abused, or shackled for days or 
weeks, and developed worse symptoms as a result of their treatment.16 
 A documentary exposing the horrors of Willowbrook led to numerous 
reforms, including the creation of the Protection and Advocacy Systems.17  
These are non-profits that exist in every state and territory.  They exist to 
protect the legal and civil rights of persons with disabilities.  Bridgewater 
was also the topic of a documentary that was prevented from public release 
by various courts—including the United States Supreme Court.18  Pennhurst 
was the subject of a documentary and a landmark lawsuit.  In Suffer the Little 
Children,19 Pennhurst’s tortuous treatment was shown for all the world to 
see.  In two separate Pennhurst cases, however, the United States Supreme 
Court failed to protect those with disabilities from horrific treatment.  In 
Pennhurst I, the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights provision of the 
Developmental Disabilities and Bill of Rights Act, which granted a right, 
inter alia, to proper treatment was not enforceable and did not actually create 
any substantive rights.20  That Court then remanded the case, directing the 
lower court to consider whether state law prohibited the type of treatment 
and abuse the patients at Pennhurst were receiving.21  When that case, 
 
 13. See McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15, 19–21 (Ind. 1846), overruled on other grounds by 
Grimes’ Ex’res v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198 (1871). 
 14. Derek Warden, A Worsened Discrimination: How Exacerbation of Disabilities Consti-
tutes Discrimination by Reason of Disability Under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act, 46 S. U. L. REV. 14, 21 (2018). 
 15. Id. at 22. 
 16. See id. at 22–29. 
 17. Derek Warden, The Americans with Disabilities Act at Thirty, 11 CAL. L. REV. 308, 310 
(2020), https://www.californialawreview.org/americans-with-disabilities-act-thirty/; see Kelsey 
McCowan Heilman, The Rights of Others: Protection and Advocacy Organizations’ Associational 
Standing to Sue, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 237, 241 (2008) (discussing history of the Protection and 
Advocacy Systems). 
 18. Wiseman v. Massachusetts, 398 U.S. 960 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting from denial of 
cert.) (describing the film as “[portraying] patient-routine and treatment of the inmates [that is a] 
scathing indictment of the inhumane conditions that prevailed at the time of the film . . .”); TITICUT 
FOLLIES (Zipporah Films 1967) (documentary about Bridgewater Hospital). 
 19. SUFFER THE LITTLE CHILDREN (NBC 1968) (documentary about Pennhurst State 
School). 
 20. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 21. Id. at 31 n. 24 (“On remand following our reversal, the Court of Appeals will be in a 
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Pennhurst II, went back to the Supreme Court, the Court held that plaintiffs 
could not sue state actors for injunctive relief for violations of state law.22 
 Throughout this time, however, much more disability rights work was 
being done.  Various federal laws were enacted to ease some suffering those 
with disabilities were facing.  Chief among these were what is now called 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act23 and the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973—Section 504 of which prohibits discrimination against those with 
disabilities by entities receiving federal financial assistance.24  Nonetheless, 
and for various reasons, these laws failed to adequately address the problems 
people with disabilities faced.25  For this reason, Congress enacted (with 
widespread public support) the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(“ADA” or “Americans with Disabilities Act”).26  Divided into five Titles, 
the ADA covers virtually all aspects of human life, and each part can be seen 
as working in unison with the others.27  The ADA was modeled on the Re-
habilitation Act, though the ADA applies to organizations and entities re-
gardless of whether they receive federal financial assistance.28  
 
B. The Louisiana Constitution 
 
 While the ADA is doubtlessly the most famous disability rights law and 
ranks among the most famous laws in American history, it is not alone in its 
efforts to protect those with disabilities.  As noted above, we have numerous 
federal laws, state laws, state policies, and court decisions that have also 
helped.  As this article will show, one such law that also helps is the Louisi-
ana Constitution.  
The Louisiana Constitution contains two express Equal Protection 
Clauses and each one lists various protected characteristics.  Article I, section 
3 prohibits discriminatory laws; and as such, it is said to apply only to laws—
though as originally understood it was meant to apply to both law and con-
duct.29  Article I, section 12, on the other hand, applies to those people who 
 
position to consider the state-law issues in light of the Pennsylvania's Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion.”). 
 22. Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
 23. 20 U.S.C. §1400–82 (West 2019). 
 24. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1973). 
 25. Warden, supra note 8, at 44–45. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 45 (discussing the various Titles of the ADA). 
 28. K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 29.  “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.  No law shall discriminate 
against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations.  No law shall arbitrarily, 
capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, phys-
ical condition, or political ideas or affiliations.  Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited, 
except in the latter case as punishment for crime.”  LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.   See Winn v. New 
Orleans City, 919 F. Supp. 2d 743, 751 (E.D. La. 2013) (collecting authorities).  I note, however, 
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discriminate.30  This provision is said to apply to government as well as pri-
vate entities (e.g., schools, hospitals, stores, and so forth).31  These two pro-
visions contain mostly the same language.  There is a different level of scru-
tiny depending on the characteristics.  As relevant to this article, the clauses 
contain a prohibition on discrimination on the basis of “physical condi-
tion.”32  That type of discrimination is subject to “intermediate scrutiny;” 
which means that discrimination on that basis is prohibited unless such dis-
crimination substantially furthers an important interest.33  Furthermore, the 
two clauses are interpreted together.34  
The debates surrounding these clauses were chaotic to say the least.  
There were two different versions of the “physical condition” discrimination 
provision in what is now article I section 12.  The earlier version prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of “physical handicap.”  However, the Constitu-
tion eventually adopted the broader version of “physical condition” used in 
section 3.  The substantive protection of the clause did not, however, change.  
And to the extent that it did change, the broader language necessarily in-
cludes the same or more protection than the original version.  Therefore, this 
article will be referring to debates as to both provisions and versions for 
guidance throughout its pages. 
The Constitution of Louisiana has another Equal Protection Clause.  The 
Louisiana Constitution’s Due Process Clause is said to have a substantive 
component.35  The substantive component is said to include an Equal 
 
that the original meaning of this clause (at least for “physical condition” discrimination) was for it 
to apply to laws or conduct because such was expressly stated and implied by other statements of 
the framers.  Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts 
volume VI at 1021 (Aug. 29, 1973) [hereinafter Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 
38th Day].  At the constitutional convention, Delegate Roy stated that the article I, §3 provision 
applied to “In layman’s language, this section [requires] equal protection of the law . . . [and applies 
to] state law or conduct.”  Id.  (emphasis added); Delegate Roy went further and noted that the 
clause also applied to government employment practices as well.  Id. at 1017 (stating, “Why should 
there be a law that prevents a physically handicapped person from working for the state of Louisiana 
. . . .”).  Another discussion on this point came up in a dialogue between Delegates Avant and De 
Blieux where it was agreed that in order to invoke the protections of article I, §3 against employ-
ment practices, the plaintiff would still have to meet what amounts to the essential functions of the 
employment position.  Id. at 1019 (noting that a bus driver had to be able to see and an individual 
must still “be able to do the job.”). All these references to employment practices, moreover, make 
it clear that the framers intended these clauses to apply to the employment context. 
 30. “In access to public areas, accommodations, and facilities, every person shall be free from 
discrimination based on race, religion, or national ancestry and from arbitrary, capricious, or un-
reasonable discrimination based on age, sex, or physical condition.”  LA. CONST. art. I, § 12.  
 31. Lee Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of The Louisiana Constitution, 35 LA. L. REV. 
1, 37 (1974) (noting the debate around the clause applying to both government and private individ-
uals). 
 32. See supra notes 29 and 30. 
 33. Albright, 879 So. 2d 121 at 134; Pace v. State Through Louisiana State Employees Re-
tirement System, 648 So. 2d 1302, 1305 (La. 1995). 
 34. Albright, 879 So. 2d 121 at 134. 
 35. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.  Richard P. Bullock, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana 
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Protection component.  This is a carry-over from the previous Louisiana 
Constitution, which did not contain an Equal Protection Clause;36 but an 
equal protection right was found in the Due Process Clause.37  Because this 
theory has an equal protection component; and because laws on the same 
subject matter must be interpreted together, this suggests that the Due Pro-
cess Clause protects people from “physical condition” discrimination from 
state conduct under a similar intermediate scrutiny as described above.  In-
deed, because the Due Process Clause is not limited to “laws” as in the article 
I, section 3 context nor limited to “access to public areas” as in article I, 
section 12, it appears that the Due Process Clause applies the general princi-
ples and requirements of the other two clauses to a broader array of govern-
ment conduct.  Thus, the debates over article I, section 3 and article I, section 
12 will also help illuminate the meaning of the State’s Substantive Due Pro-
cess Equal Protection right insofar as it relates to “physical condition dis-
crimination.” 
Lastly, the Louisiana Constitution was debated and adopted one year af-
ter the adoption of the Rehabilitation Act, in the midst of the rising disability 
rights movement and the de-institutionalization movement, and it was par-
tially written by “one of the best friends” that the disability rights movement 
“ever had.”38  After looking at the express statements of the drafters and rat-
ifiers of the Louisiana Constitution it becomes clear that the framers in-
tended, and did, provide people with disabilities (against state and, to a sim-
ilar extent, private entities) four disability specific rights: the right to be free 
from disparate treatment, the right to reasonable accommodations and mod-
ifications, the right to be free from disparate impact of otherwise neutral acts; 
 
Constitution of 1974: The Louisiana Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 51 LA. L. REV. 787, 791–
92 (1991) (discussing the substantive nature of the State Due Process clause and its expansion over 
the federal version). 
 36. James Harvey Domengeaux, Native-Born Acadians and the Equality Ideal, 46 LA. L. REV. 
1151, 1189 (1986) (discussing the lack of an Equal Protection Clause in the 1921 Constitution). 
 37. Hargrave, supra note 31.  Further, I note that my “carry-over” theory of equal protection 
is not mere theory.  The framers of the State Constitution expressly noted they were carrying this 
Substantive Due Process over.  Id. at 4 (noting, “What was meant to be continued [was] the current 
status of the law . . . fundamental fairness.”).  Indeed, to say that substantive due process does not 
also contain a general equal protection component would be tantamount to legal heresy.  After all, 
the schools of the District of Columbia were desegregated on a substantive due process equal pro-
tection ground.  See Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).  Recent Louisiana Appellate Court 
decisions appear to have continued the tradition of finding “equal protection” within “substantive 
due process.”  Melerine v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 210 So. 3d 929, 934 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2017) 
(citing Estay v. Lafourche Parish Sch. Bd., 230 So.2d 443, 447 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969)); see also 
Plaquemines Parish Gov’t v. River/Road Const. Inc., 828 So. 2d 16, 24 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2002) 
(noting the relevance of federal due process law which contains a substantive equal protection com-
ponent in interpreting the state Due Process Clause). 
 38. Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 38th Day, supra note 29, at 1020 (Del-
egate Rayburn stated, “They’ve got physically handicapped in here.  I’m one of the best friends 
they’ve ever had.”). 
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and the right to integration, which includes a right to be free from unjustified 
institutionalization. 
 
II. Defining “Disability” 
 
The reason why it is important to define “disability” here is that “disa-
bility discrimination” has a much different history than other forms of dis-
crimination including that history based simply on one’s current health or 
other physical attributes.39  This history is the very reason why the ADA has 
legal theories that are either not found or cognizable in other laws.40  Indeed, 
that history will later play hand-in-hand with the arguments made in this ar-
ticle, because the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 was adopted just one year 
after the Rehabilitation Act and during the early disability rights movement 
as well as the de-institutionalization movement.41 
The term “physical condition” may appear, at face value to be limited to 
physical disabilities.  However, such a limited reading is unjustified.  First, 
Louisiana courts have already noted that the phrase clearly expands to dis-
crimination based on one’s “health or handicap,”42 which would include 
mental illness as well.  Second, the State Constitutional Convention is filled 
with phrases that suggest the clauses necessarily include mental disabilities 
as well as physical ones.  For example, the clauses were clearly intended 
(because they expressly said so in the Convention) to also protect returning 
veterans who are widely known to suffer from both mental and physical dis-
abilities.43  Moreover, one author of the Equal Protection Clause who advo-
cated for inclusion of a disability rights provision expressly noted that this 
clause would cover not just physical disabilities, but others as well.44  Finally, 
 
 39. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985). 
 40. Warden, supra note 8, at 51–53 (discussing legitimacy and enforceability of methods of 
administration claims).  Moreover, no one would say, for example, that denying someone entrance 
to a school because they had the flu has the same history as denying someone entrance to a school 
because they use a wheelchair. 
 41. See Samuel Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2012) (discussing the history of deinstitutionalization). 
 42. Revere v. Canulette, 715 So. 2d 47, 53 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998) (“‘Physical condition’ 
refers to classifications on the basis of one’s health or handicap.”).  The phrase “health or handicap” 
indicates that the clause has two separate components—one focused on health and one focused on 
disability.  
 43. Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 38th Day, supra note 29, at 1021 
(“Someone made mention about the handicapped.  More than a hundred thousand of our young 
men are handicapped.  Not because it was their desire to leave from home, but because of obedience 
to this country, go to war they are handicapped . . . they should not be denied a job because of this 
handicap.  They should not be denied access to buildings because of handicapped.”).  This was said 
in relation to what is now article I, section 3. 
 44. Id. at 1017.  When pressed on the issue, delegate Roy expressly stated, “There’s no prob-
lem there . . . we have not [allowed such persons to] be denied the equal protection of the laws . . . 
.”  This was said in regard to what is now article I, section 3. 
 
Summer 2021      HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY 586 
it is well known that many psychiatric and developmental disabilities are 
caused by physical malformations in the brain. 
Considering that we have shown the clauses protect the whole gamut of 
“disabilities,” it is now useful to determine what “disabilities” are, for pur-
poses of the Louisiana Constitution.  There is no specific definition found in 
the Constitution.  Thus, we must look to other sources for inspiration as to 
its meaning.   
History certainly helps to understand what the framers of the Louisiana 
Constitution meant.  During the debates, it was clear that the framers were 
drawing support from federal law; indeed, one member, when speaking 
about these Equal Protection Clauses, expressly noted that they were doing 
what federal statutes already did.45  Thus, we could take some clues from the 
then recently (and very publicly) enacted Rehabilitation Act.  We could also 
take notice from other statements made at the Constitutional Convention.  In 
discussing the Constitution as a whole, it was noted that the state courts could 
draw on a number of sources to deduce the meaning of these clauses, and 
that these broad provisions could grow over time.46  Other statements suggest 
that “disability” can be defined based on limitations of daily functions, or the 
perception of others.47  Thus, the Constitution’s definition of “disability” 
would seem to be a practical one, and not simply a legally technical one.  As 
such, the standard definition of disability would seem to be applicable here: 
“a physical, mental, cognitive, or developmental condition that impairs, in-
terferes with, or limits a person’s ability to engage in certain tasks or actions 
or participate in typical daily activities and interactions.”48 
Though I recognize the practical nature of the Constitution; I also recog-
nize that it is a legal document filled with legal technicalities.  There is, how-
ever, a general common legal definition of disability.  Indeed, similar 
 
 45. Delegate Jackson expressly stated, in regard to article I, section 3, “there have been laws 
enacted on the federal and state level [on these] classes and categories of people.”  Id.  at 1027. 
 46. Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Journal of the Proceedings 
volume I (July 5, 1973) at 80 [hereinafter Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume I 10th 
Day] (“And while we are formulating this roadmap, let us not forget that this map is not just for 
us—it is going to be carefully scrutineer and effectively expanded upon by judges and professors, 
lawyers and politicians, and scholars . . . If worthy, [the Constitution] will create the legal mechan-
ics whereby people of good will and industry may respond to the ills of society.”); Hargrave, supra 
note 31, at 9 (“In the future, evolving standards of society as developed by the courts of the state 
will have to be taken into account along with those applied in development of federal standards.  
The background of the provision indicates that a grudging application of the guarantee is not war-
ranted.  Rather, an expansive application independent of, and, in some instances, beyond the federal 
standards is suggested.”). 
 47. Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts vol-
ume VI (Aug. 31, 1973) [hereinafter Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 40th Day] 
at 1089 (statement by delegate Willis suggesting that one does not have a disability based simply 
on a depreciation in physical condition that no-one could notice).   
 48. Disability, Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disability 
(last visited November 12, 2020). 
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definitions of disability have existed in state laws for decades.  That defini-
tion is now part of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.  As such, in light of 
all of this, it seems clear, that the best definition of disability would be the 
one now used in the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
While there are some caveats and exclusions, the general definition of 
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act is: “(A) a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities 
of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded 
as having such an impairment.”49  Nonetheless, I admit that the Louisiana 
courts, in their considered judgement, and with the wisdom of practice, may 
well see fit to alter such a definition.50  Furthermore, it may well be easier to 
prove a disability under the Louisiana Constitution than under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act because our State Constitution is notorious for being 
more expansive than its federal counterparts.  Such expansion would help 
fulfill the broad remedial purposes behind adding the “physical condition” 
provisions into our State Constitution.51 
I turn now to the words of a Louisiana advocate for those who stutter as 
an example of “disability” under the Louisiana Constitution, and to suggest 
that Louisiana courts may take an even broader approach to “disability” in 
practice.  That advocate, James Hayden, has expertly explained the impact 
disabilities have on individuals—even when those disabilities are not “ac-
tive.”  Hayden, in a recent book, discusses his past stuttering.  He offers two 
statements of great importance here.  First, he states, “[t]here are some in-
stances when people don’t think you can or should give a presentation, be a 
tour guide, or do anything else that involves public speaking because of the 
fact that you stutter.”52  Second, Hayden states: 
 
I didn’t participate in class because I was afraid [the stutter] 
would make an untimely visit.  I had to write a script every 
time I wanted to talk on the phone in case it was a three-way 
conversation between [the stutter], me, and the person on 
the other end.  I wouldn’t order through a drive thru in case 
[the stutter] ordered something I didn’t want.53  
 
It would seem, based on the various and powerful statements made by the 
framers of our Louisiana Constitution, that they would look at Mr. Hayden’s 
 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (1990). 
 50. Hargrave, supra note 31, at 9.  
 51. Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 40th Day, supra note 47, at 1087 (de-
claring such language was needed to fully bring people with disabilities into the polity of our state; 
and such was needed for people with disabilities to “be accepted as full citizens.”). 
 52. JAMES HAYDEN, DEAR WORLD, I STUTTER: A SERIES OF OPEN LETTERS FROM A PERSON 
WHO STUTTERS 57 (2017). 
 53. Id. at 52. 
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statements with legal horror.  Thus, while there may be some who would say 
Hayden’s statements do not constitute a disability under the original Reha-
bilitation Act or the ADA,54 there can be little doubt that our framers de-
signed a constitution to obliterate the very social stigma that Hayden was 
addressing.55 
III. Disparate Treatment 
 
 Having defined “physical condition” as including “disability,” and hav-
ing defined “disability” as essentially mirroring the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act in part, it is now appropriate to consider the various theories of dis-
crimination that may apply to the Louisiana Constitution, once it is 
recognized that these clauses protect individuals with disabilities from dis-
crimination.  
 The first theory up for discussion is “disparate treatment.”  In the lan-
guage of Title II of the ADA (which involves government entities), it is said 
that “disparate treatment” is the same as “intentional discrimination.”56 How-
ever, this is a misnomer.  One does not need to prove intent under Title II of 
the ADA, unless one is seeking damages.57  It merely refers to treating people 
with disabilities in a discriminatory manner by reason of their disability.58  
While admitting that the ADA would allow non-intentional disparate 
treatment claims, I do not believe it is possible at this juncture to say that the 
Louisiana Constitution does.59  Moreover, because of what is said below, 
there is no practical reason to discuss the esoteric theory as to why disparate 
treatment need not be intentional for purposes of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion.60  
As the doctrine currently stands, the Louisiana Constitution prohibits 
discrimination against those with disabilities unless the attorney defending 
the law or the person so discriminating can show that the law or act “sub-
stantially furthers an important interest.”61  One must show discriminatory 
 
 54. Medvic v. Compass Sign Co., LLC, Civ. No. 10-5222, 2011 WL 3513499, at *5 (E.D. 
Penn. Aug. 10, 2011) (noting disagreement on the issue of stuttering as a disability).   
 55. The anti-stigma idea is reflected in several portions of the Constitutional Convention.  
Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 38th Day, supra note 29, at 1020 (Delegate Ray-
burn criticizing what some judges thought about people with some physical impairments); Consti-
tutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 40th Day, supra note 47, at 1087 (statement by Dele-
gate Bergeron condemning law firm for not hiring man, simply because he had a disability). 
 56. Derek Warden, A Helping Hand: Examining the Relationship Between (1) Title II of the 
ADA’s Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity Cases and (2) the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in 
§1983 and Bivens Cases to Expand and Strengthen Sources of “Clearly Established Law” in Civil 
Rights Actions, 29 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RIGHTS. L.J. 43, 65 (2018). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. That is not to say such could never be proven under the Louisiana Constitution. 
 60. This is so because the State Constitution, as will be shown below, prohibits disparate im-
pact of otherwise neutral laws.  The Constitution also prohibits other forms of discrimination.  
 61. Albright, 879 So. 2d at 134. 
 
589 DISABILITY RIGHTS AND THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION Vol. 48:4 
intent under the current disparate treatment disability doctrine.62  That intent 
can be shown in a number of ways.  One such way is by showing that the 
law is facially discriminatory.63  One example can be seen in the way Loui-
siana charges fees for accessible parking tags.  The fees associated with these 
tags necessarily only apply to those with disabilities/physical impairments.64  
Moreover, it would seem unlikely that the state could show that these sub-
stantially further an important government interest.  An argument could be 
made that the tags allow for the raising of revenue or covering costs of print-
ing the tags.  However, it is known that such interests are not “important” in 
the parlance of constitutional law, they are merely “legitimate”65 and legiti-
mate is not enough. 
 
IV. Accommodation and Modification 
 
A. Accommodation Requirements Generally 
 
Leaving the standard form of discrimination behind, I come now to the 
accommodation and modification theory of discrimination protected under 
the Louisiana Constitution.  Under federal, and many state, laws the concepts 
of “accommodation” and “modification” are actually one and the same.66  
Thus, it is said that while Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act only 
contains a “modification requirement” and not an “accommodation require-
ment,” the two actually mean the same thing.67  As such, whether one is re-
questing a modification in a policy or procedure to accommodate their disa-
bility or asking for some structural alteration, the two are for the most part 
the same theory. 
Moreover, at the federal level, the accommodation and modification pro-
visions are limited by reasonableness rules.  For example, it is said that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to only “reasonable accommodations;”68 there are sev-
eral exceptions to the modification and accommodation requirement that to 
many would seem to be perfectly reasonable.  Indeed, even in the architec-
tural requirements mandated as modifications, there are exceptions such as 
 
 62. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); State v. Baxley, 656 So. 2d 973, 978 (La. 
1995).  The framers clearly intended this type of conduct to remain condemnable.  See Constitu-
tional Convention Transcripts volume VI 40th Day, supra note 47, at 1087 (statement by Delegate 
Bergeron discussing outright denial of employment opportunity). 
 63. See Warden, supra note 5. 
 64. Dare v. Cal., 191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 65. Klinger v. Dir., Dep’t of Revenue, State of Mo., 455 F.3d 888, 894 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 66. See Warden, supra note 56, at 61. 
 67. See Warden, supra note 56, at 61.  For the principle that physical construction requirement 
constitutes “accommodations.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (noting that “reasonable accommoda-
tion” includes “making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by 
individuals with disabilities”). 
 68. See Warden, supra note 56, at 61.  
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where changes would work a fundamental alteration to the service, program, 
or activity;69 to protect the historic nature of the building;70 and where there 
is an impossibility of making certain places accessible due to the physical 
terrain.71 
 
B. Accommodation Theory Under the Louisiana Constitution 
 
The question this part seeks to answer then is this: is there an accommo-
dation and modification component to the Louisiana Constitution’s disability 
rights clauses?  The answer is yes.  There are numerous reasons why there is 
an unwritten right to accommodations and modifications in the Louisiana 
Constitution.  For example, the state constitutional provisions on point pro-
hibit discrimination by reason of a disability.  It is now widely understood 
that discrimination that would not have been suffered without a disability is 
discrimination by reason of disability, especially when discussing public en-
tities.72  Thus, denying access due to physical inaccessibility is discrimina-
tion by reason of disability. 
Moreover, American history and constant jurisprudence have shown 
that, without a reasonable accommodation or modification provision, any 
prohibition on discrimination against those with disabilities would be ren-
dered a vain and idle enactment.73  Considering that we are to construe laws 
as having an effect, this suggests that we must construe our state disability 
provisions as containing an accommodation and modification component.  
This last point brings up another fact.  As noted above, our State Consti-
tution’s framers intended for the document’s rights provisions to help create 
justice and to cure various social injustices.  That the entire country now 
recognizes accommodation and modifications are needed to cure the injus-
tice and stigma faced by those with disabilities, such also suggests that ac-
commodations and modifications are a part of the state disability rights pro-
visions.74  
Furthermore, there can be no doubt that the framers of our State Consti-
tution believed that there should be an accommodation requirement.  This is 
so because the drafters, when debating the disability rights provisions, 
 
 69. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (a)(3) (2012). 
 70. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (a)(2).  
 71. 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 (a)(2) (2011). 
 72. Derek Warden, Ex Tenebris Lux: Buck v. Bell and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 51 
UNIVERSITY TOL. L. REV. 57, 68 (2019). 
 73. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360–61 (2000) (noting the pro-
hibition on discrimination in government employment cases, and that “to this end” the act requires 
reasonable accommodations, which may include making physical facilities accessible). 
 74. Indeed, there are laws similar to the ADA in every state of the Union.  Brief for Petitioners 
at 49, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360–61 (2000) (No. 99-1240), 
(listing such policies or laws in every state). 
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expressly noted that they would require alterations and accommodations.75 
The framers also indicated their desire to include an accommodation require-
ment because they said that the law would do what was being done with 
 
 75. Some delegates opposed the clauses because they would require such alterations; others 
supported the additions because they would require reasonable accommodations.  In any event, it 
is clear from discussion as to the “physical condition” provisions and early versions thereof that the 
framers intended there to be a reasonable accommodation and modification theory in the Constitu-
tion of Louisiana.  For the sake of clarity, those statements made on the 38th day of proceedings 
relate to § 3 and those made on the 40th day of proceedings relate to what is now§ 12.   I list those 
statements here:  
 
• Persons with disabilities “should not be denied access to buildings because of handicap.”  
Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 38th Day, supra note 29, at 1021. 
• Persons with disabilities should have “adequate accesses and exits” and that these modifica-
tions should be reasonable without “substantial costs” and noting the right to physical access 
to “theatres, hotels, and restaurants.”  Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 40th 
Day, supra note 47, at 1087. 
• Requirements for alterations would apply to “new constructions going up.”  Id. at 1090.  That 
this same conversation noted that the provisions would not change every building or alter 
the building code is of no moment.  First, under my theory here, not every accommodation 
or alteration one seeks is required.  Second, it is standard knowledge that neither the ADA 
nor the Rehabilitation Act are “building codes” either.  Thus, the provisions under discussion 
here are not, in and of themselves, building codes. 
• If people with disabilities are still able to “do the job” it is apparent that the delegates still 
wanted them to be accommodated otherwise such discrimination would be “unreasonable.”  
Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 38th Day, supra note 29, at 1019. 
• “[W]hen it comes to the physically handicapped . . . that is done by an act of Congress . . . 
[the amendment may] require certain people to make certain accommodations for the phys-
ically handicapped…and now we are talking about a constitution for all the people, now, 
that requires that we must have a ramp . . .”  Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume 
VI 40th Day, supra note 47, at 1087. 
• Delegate Bergeron stated in regard to what is now article I, section 12: 
 
O.K. Well . . . we’ve just explained that that takes care of the employ-
ment section.  Now let’s get on to the public accommodations.  Do you not 
feel that some of the larger industries such as theaters, such as restaurants, 
who have changed all over the country, why are they in business?  They are 
in business to accommodate the public, are they not?  That’s why they are in 
business.  Why should the physically handicapped be excluded form that cat-
egory as the public? . . . 
 
I stress to you the point that the handicapped of our state want to become 
active citizens of our state.  They want to play an equal role as tax paying, job 
working citizens.  Just give them a chance . . . give them a chance to go to the 
places where we want to go . . . give them a chance to go to restaurants, to go 
to theatres, to go to hotels.  I talked to one boy not long ago, and many of you 
might agree on this problem, he couldn’t use the dressing room for eight 
hours.  He couldn’t get his wheelchair in the dressing room stall.  I say that’s 
a problem. 
 
Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 38th Day, supra note 29, at 1089. 
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federal law at the time.76  Federal law at the time, namely the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 (passed right before the Louisiana Constitution), contains an 
accommodation requirement.77  
Even though the Louisiana Constitution does require accommodations 
and modifications, the discussion does not end there.  Assuming that a plain-
tiff has shown they need an accommodation or modification, one would be 
forced to ask what arguments the State or other entities could offer in their 
defense against claims of failure to accommodate.  The answer to this ques-
tion is simple.  The defendant, just as in standard Louisiana equal protection 
law, could show that the failure to provide the accommodation or modifica-
tion substantially furthered an important interest.  Such defenses could be 
that the accommodation sought would undermine the entire state program, 
that the modification would destroy the historic nature of the public or pri-
vate building, or that the modification would be impossible or put other peo-
ple’s lives at risk.  
As one could tell, these defenses would go hand in hand with the stand-
ard ADA requirement that the accommodation must be reasonable.  Thus, 
the accommodation or modification requirements of our state’s disability 
rights constitutional provisions are truly just a “reasonable accommodation 
and modification” provision.  Such a notion reflects numerous facts about 
our jurisprudential and cultural history.  First, at the Louisiana Constitutional 
Convention, the framers discussed the accommodation requirement in terms 
of reasonableness.  For example, they said that provisions do not apply to 
bus drivers who have no vision.78  They also said that any alteration require-
ments for physical structures would apply going forward.79  Furthermore, as 
 
 76. Delegate Jackson expressly stated, in regard to Article I, section 3, “there have been laws 
enacted on the federal and state level [on these] classes and categories of people.”  Constitutional 
Convention Transcripts volume VI 38th Day, supra note 29, at 1027.  Moreover, when first con-
sidering what is now article I, section 12, Delegate Soniat spoke in in support of the measure and 
literally stated, “[f]ederal law, at the time, prohibits discrimination . . . Since this is the federal law 
already . . . we want to bring our constitution up-to-date and our state up-to-date . . . This will make 
us in keeping with present law.” Further still, Delegate Jackson also stated: 
 
when it comes to the physically handicapped . . . that is done by an act of 
Congress . . . [the amendment may] require certain people to make certain 
accommodations for the physically handicapped…and now we are talking 
about a constitution for all the people, now, that requires that we must have 
a ramp . . . 
  
Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 40th Day, supra note 47, at 1087.   
 77. Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 78. Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 38th Day, supra note 29, at 1019. 
 79. Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 40th Day, supra note 47, at 1090 (not-
ing that requirements for alterations would apply to “new constructions going up”).  Of course, 
those entities that are not bound by the physical construction principles I discuss herein, due to their 
age, may still be required to offer other reasonable accommodations in policies and practices, and 
must avoid acts of disparate treatment or acts with disparate impacts on those with disabilities. 
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noted above, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 also only required reasonable 
modifications.  Moreover, numerous states have statutes on point that require 
only “reasonable modification.”80  Potentially useful sources of reasonable-
ness are the Attorney General regulations implementing the ADA and the 
various statements made by that office.  The various regulations on the ADA 
and the Rehabilitation Act are very well researched and are generally con-
trolling in most situations under federal law.81  Louisiana Courts could al-
ways look to those regulations and the statements made by the Attorney Gen-
eral for guidance as to what constitutes reasonable modifications and 
accommodations.  Finally, I note here that it would not be at all unusual for 
Louisiana courts to look to federal regulations for guidance as to what is 
reasonable for two reasons: (1) our courts have already looked to federal civil 
rights laws for guidance on the clauses at issue here82 and (2) states, includ-
ing Louisiana, already incorporate these regulations to a large extent in var-
ious statutes.83 
One question I received when writing this paper was how the reasonable 
modification rule would apply to statutes or legal doctrines.  The answer is 
simple.  Assume that a Louisiana law or doctrine or a combination of laws 
and doctrines were to exclude one class (or classes) of persons with disabil-
ities from legal remedies (as shown below in Part VII, however, disability 
 
 80. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 531 U.S. at 368 (2000) (noting that numerous states have 
adopted laws similar to the ADA). 
 81. See Warden, supra note 8 at 50–51.  
 82. Albright, 879 So. 2d at 132–33 (relying on authorities under federal law to interpret pro-
visions of the state constitution). 
 83. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:148.1.  Interestingly enough, Louisiana’s statutory requirement for 
state owned buildings is older than the State Constitution for government buildings.  LA. REV. 
STAT. § 49:148 (requiring accessible features after July 27, 1966).  Another provision enacted in 
1966 also specifically states that all political subdivisions and private entities were urged to comply 
with the same specifications.  LA. REV. STAT. § 49:148.3. 
Louisiana law specifically incorporates the ADA standards for accessibility by stating all 
standards “shall be complied with.”  LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1733.  This provision relates specifically 
to Access to Governmental and Public Facilities for which the Community may gain access.  Thus, 
it appears that all private buildings must be in compliance with the ADA’s design standards even 
if they were not necessarily required to comply with those under the ADA originally.  See Burns v. 
CLK Investments V, L.L.C., 45 So. 3d 1152, 1155 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2010) (noting Louisiana 
adopted ADA designs wholesale into its building code). 
In regard to places of public accommodation generally, another provision of Louisiana Law 
specially prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability and refers to a definition of “disability” 
remarkably similar to that found in the ADA.   LA. REV. STAT. §51: 2247 (referring to LA. REV. 
STAT. 51:2232).  However, I note that the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution are not expressly 
limited to the same extent as in legislation. The Louisiana Constitution’s clauses could still apply 
to those entities not covered by the positive legislation (e.g., private religious entities).  At that 
point, the courts should still consider what is “reasonable.”  What is reasonable, depending on the 
circumstances, may still be what the ADA requires.  In any event, those entities that receive federal 
financial support are still bound by the Rehabilitation Act.  In that case, it would be perfectly rea-
sonable to interpret the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act and the Louisiana Constitution as 
being the same. 
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claims can arise even without a comparator class, such as in intra-class dis-
crimination cases, or in situations regardless of how anyone else is treated), 
but allow other types of physical conditions or disabilities to have some legal 
recourse.  In that instance, a reasonable modification claim would require a 
court to allow a plaintiff to make their claims regardless of what the statute 
or doctrine says.  Take for example a tort claim that says only people who 
see an accident can make a claim for emotional distress.  An individual who 
is blind can still hear the accident and suffer the same type of emotional 
damages.  As such, the reasonable modification rule would require—as a 
constitutional matter—that courts allow the blind individual a reasonable 
modification to the doctrine and allow him to make a claim just like those 
with sight. 
 
V. Disparate Impact 
 
I come now to the theory of disparate impact.  Under federal ADA law, 
plaintiffs are able to make a claim that an otherwise neutral policy or practice 
has had a disparate impact on them regardless of the intent behind the law.84  
This type of claim generally requires the showing of a statistically significate 
impact.85  However, under Title II of the ADA, plaintiffs have yet another 
option—the methods of administration provision.86  This provision effec-
tively prohibits matters that have a disparate impact on persons with disabil-
ities regardless of any percentage requirement.87  Because this latter provi-
sion is of relatively recent vintage, I do not undertake to argue here that it is 
part of the Louisiana Constitution.88  However, I will argue that our state has 
a disparate impact claim for disability discrimination generally. 
All three disability discrimination provisions of the State Constitution 
could be said to have a disparate impact component.  Recall that article I, 
section 3 applies to laws that discriminate and originally (in relation to those 
with disabilities at least) was meant to apply to all government conduct as 
well as laws.  Article I, section 12 applies to those who would discriminate 
in access to public places.  Finally, the Louisiana Due Process Clause con-
tains its own disability discrimination provision to fill in any gaps that are 
left or to simply double up on the protection of the others.  
With that general understanding in mind, I turn now to show why the 
Louisiana Constitution contains a simple disparate impact claim.  First, the 
clauses themselves speak to equal protection, and by its terms does not 
 
 84. Am. with Disab. Pract. & Compl. Man. § 2:199. 
 85. Id.  
 86. See e.g., Warden, supra note 8.  
 87. Id. at 55. 
 88. Of course, I do not believe that, at this juncture, it is appropriate to say that such theory 
could never apply under the Louisiana Constitution. 
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exclude a disparate impact claim. 
Second, at the time of the framing of our Louisiana Constitution, many 
believed that the federal Equal Protection Clause contained a disparate im-
pact component.89  
Third, many statements from the framing already mentioned above, and 
more, discuss forms of disability discrimination that are now widely re-
garded as having “the indicia of disparate impact.”90   
Fourth, it is now beyond dispute that the framers of our Louisiana Con-
stitution looked to the Rehabilitation Act and other federal laws for inspira-
tion for the Louisiana Constitution.  Thus, because the Rehabilitation Act has 
long been believed to contain a disparate impact theory, so too should the 
Louisiana Constitution.91  
Relatedly, unlike virtually all other forms of discrimination, disability 
discrimination has resulted most often not from animus or ill will, but from 
indifference, neglect, apathy, and the disparate impact of otherwise neutral 
laws.  This type of widespread discrimination against people with disabilities 
is now “clear beyond peradventure.”92  This was widely understood in re-
gards to the Rehabilitation Act (indeed, it was part of Congress’s explicit 
understanding as well as the Supreme Court’s).93 Considering that the fram-
ers of our Louisiana Constitution wished to rid persons with disabilities of 
the stigma and discrimination associated with their conditions,94 and further 
considering that the hallmark of disability discrimination and stigma is dis-
parate impact—it appears only logical that the framers of our Louisiana Con-
stitution intended to, and by the words they wrote did, provide persons with 
disabilities a straight forward disparate impact theory of discrimination. 
Finding that persons with disabilities have a disparate impact claim is 
not far outside the norm.  Many state laws and, of course, federal laws allow 
such theories.95  Such a theory is also not too far outside what is already done 
at the federal constitutional level and Louisiana constitutional level.  Both 
 
 89. The Supreme Court of the United States would not conclusively answer that Equal Pro-
tection requires intent until years after the adoption of the Louisiana Constitution.  Washington, 
426 U.S. at 229. 
 90. Cf. supra note 77 (discussing types of accommodations and modifications) with Nunes v. 
Mass. Dep’t of Correction, 766 F.3d 136, 145 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting such claims have the indicia 
of disparate impact claims). 
 91. Am. with Disab. Pract. & Compl. Man. § 1:266.  That one court has held there is no 
disparate impact claim under the Rehabilitation Act is of no moment here.  The point is that most 
people believed that there was such a claim that influenced the thoughts of those who framed the 
Louisiana Constitution. 
 92. Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004). 
 93. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 295. 
 94. See Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 38th Day, supra note 29, at 1020; 
see also Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume VI 40th Day, supra note 47, at 1087. 
 95. Nunes, 766 F.3d at 145. 
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allow disparate impact to be evidence of intent.96  Thus, where there is 
enough disparate impact, they would allow claims of intentional discrimina-
tion.97  Moreover, the history of disability discrimination demonstrates why 
persons with disabilities should have a straightforward “disparate impact” 
claim, even while others do not, i.e., disability discrimination most often re-
sulted from neglect, apathy, and the disparate impacts of otherwise neutral 
actions and laws.  That history is the express reason why disparate impact 
type regulations have been upheld in the ADA context.98 
The next question to be considered is how large of a disparity there must 
be for a plaintiff to make a claim that an otherwise neutral law, policy, or 
practice, has had a disparate impact on them.  Unfortunately, even under 
well-established federal law, there is no clear answer, and the disparity may 
well change depending on the circumstance.99  Thus, the same can be said of 
our Louisiana Constitution.  There is no clear disparity that must be ascer-
tained, and reasoned judgment must guide the courts in making their deci-
sions.  Of course, in situations where the harm falls on a group of individuals, 
one hundred percent of whom have disabilities, there could be little doubt 
that there has been a disparate impact. 
As in discussing the reasonable modifications rule above, finding that 
there is a disparate impact claim that persons with disabilities can assert be-
gets another question: what defenses could the state raise when confronted 
with such claims?  The answer is rather straightforward.  Under the Louisi-
ana Constitution, discrimination against persons with disabilities is allowed 
where the discrimination substantially furthers an important government in-
terest.  This seems to track the standard defense asserted in federal disparate 
impact claims which holds that, “if a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing 
of a disparate impact, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that its ac-
tions furthered, in theory and in practice, a legitimate, bona fide governmen-
tal interest and that no alternative would serve that interest with less discrim-
inatory effect.”100  But because the Louisiana Constitution uses intermediate 
scrutiny for its disability rights provisions, the discrimination must substan-
tially further an important interest, not simply a legitimate and bona fide one. 
One potential area where disparate impact on the basis of disability could 
come into play is in the death penalty arena.  As evident from above, the 
claim could arise from article I, section 3 (applicable to laws or, as originally 
understood, to conduct as well) or article I, section 2’s Due Process Clause 
 
 96. Washington, 426 U.S. at 241–42; Baxley, 656 So. 2d at 978. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See generally Warden, supra note 8 (discussing the Methods of Administration regulation 
under the ADA being valid to do disparate impact type of history of disability discrimination), and 
see Alexander, 469 U.S. at 295 (noting the history of neglect, apathy, and indifference associated 
with disability discrimination). 
 99. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 51 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 100. Am. with Disab. Pract. & Compl. Man. § 2:199. 
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(applicable to government conduct as a whole).  The act of execution would 
be the neutral policy or practice.  Virtually everyone on death row in Loui-
siana has a disability.101  In other words, as described above, one hundred 
percent of those potentially suffering the harm of execution have a disability, 
while, in the general population, only about twelve percent of the population 
have disabilities.102  Therefore, the current policy or practice of execution—
if carried out—could potentially be said to have an unconstitutional disparate 
impact on those with disabilities.  
Assuming the death penalty context would be subject to a disparate im-
pact claim, the state would still be able to show that the act of execution 
substantially furthers an important government interest.  Without the benefit 
of an evidentiary hearing, or being involved in any specific litigation, it is 
difficult to determine if the state has an important interest here, or if it has 
only a legitimate interest.  However, in the context of disability discrimina-
tion, it is unlikely the state has a sufficiently important interest to justify the 
discrimination here.  For example, the state could argue that execution would 
substantially further its interest in carrying out sentences.  However, such an 
argument would lead to absurdity.  If carrying out sentences were an im-
portant enough interest to discriminate against those with disabilities, then it 
would be important enough for the state to criminalize having a disability.  
Thus, the state could go so far as to argue that its interest would be furthered 
by convicting people with disabilities and incarcerating them.  Because in-
terpretations that lead to absurdity must be avoided,103 the ability of the state 
to assert carrying out of sentences as an important interest here must also be 
denied.  Neither can the state argue that the disparate impact caused by exe-
cution furthers its interest in separating these inmates from the general pop-
ulation.  Denying the state the right of execution says nothing about whether 
they can segregate death penalty inmates.  It means only that, until such time 
as the disparate impact has passed, the state cannot carry out executions.104  
 
VI. Integration and Unjustified Institutionalization 
 
Finally, I come to the issue of institutionalization and integration.105  In 
 
 101. Warden, supra note 17. 
 102. Kristen Bialik, 7 Facts about Americans with Disabilities, PEW RES. CTR, 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/07/27/7-facts-about-americans-with-disabilities/ 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2020). 
 103. La. Civ. Code 9. 
 104. In the disparate impact situation as described above, it would remain to be seen how long 
the State would have to wait to again try to execute someone.  It would seem absurd and a burden 
on judicial resources if the State could return every week declaring that there is no longer a disparate 
impact in its death penalty practices. 
 105. Integration is the flip side of institutionalization.  In other words, the integration mandate 
is used to justify the prohibition on unjustified institutionalization.  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. 
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the history of disability discrimination, there is no act of government more 
grotesque than the acts that occurred as a result of mass institutionalization 
in either mental health asylums or other institutions.106  It is a shame upon 
our nation that the people who suffered torturous and heinous conditions in 
these places were sent there for help, but received only pain instead.107  Be-
cause of societal neglect, indifference, and the disparate impact of polices 
tolerated by the general public, they were subject to malnourishment, beat-
ings, sexual assault, and death.108  
This last fact brings us to the first justification as to why the Louisiana 
Constitution’s provisions regarding disability discrimination must include a 
provision that prohibits institutionalization.  That our framers were seeking 
to rid us of the stigma and injustice that so prolifically surrounded disability 
discrimination and disabilities as such, almost necessarily means they meant 
to do something about the horrors of mass institutionalization.  Indeed, they 
made comments about the right to participate as full citizens, which suggest 
a right to community existence should be found within the Constitution.109  
To be clear, the framers of the Louisiana Constitution were no doubt aware 
of what had happened in mental health asylums at the time.  The entire coun-
try was aware, and that is why beginning around the time of the Louisiana 
Constitution, the de-institutionalization movement was reaching a fever 
pitch.110  Furthermore, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, passed just before the 
Louisiana Constitution, contains a provision that was often thought to pro-
hibit unjustified institutionalization as being a form of disability discrimina-
tion.111  As such, our framers, looking to federal law to achieve what the anti-
discrimination provision of the Act did, strongly suggests that they intended, 
and by their words did, provide some form of prohibition on institutionali-
zation and segregation. 
The second justification for finding that the State Constitution’s anti-
disability discrimination provisions contain a prohibition on institutionaliza-
tion comes from the simple fact that, as Justice Ginsburg noted in her now 
canonical Olmstead v. L.C. opinion, often institutionalization is a form of 
 
Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).  
 106. Warden, supra note 14, at 21–29. 
 107. Id. at 22. 
 108. Id. at 21–29. 
 109. This is most evident from the reference to full citizenship.  Full citizenship is logically 
impossible where someone is unjustifiably institutionalized.  Constitutional Convention Transcripts 
volume VI 40th Day, supra note 47, at 1087. 
 110. See Bagenstos, supra note 41, at 7 (“[F]rom the early 1970s until the 1990s, the deinsti-
tutionalization movement centered around two major campaigns: the campaign to close large state 
mental hospitals, and the campaign to close large state facilities housing people with intellectual 
and developmental disabilities.”). 
 111. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600 (noting use of the Rehabilitation Act but noting its mixed 
successes as well).  It is now settled that the Rehabilitation Act does contain such a community-
based setting and integration requirement.  Am.with Disab.: Pract. & Compl. Man.§ 1:80. 
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dissimilar or disparate treatment.  As she so aptly wrote: 
 
Dissimilar treatment correspondingly exists in this key re-
spect: In order to receive needed medical services, persons 
with mental disabilities must, because of those disabilities, 
relinquish participation in community life they could enjoy 
given reasonable accommodations, while persons without 
mental disabilities can receive the medical services they 
need without similar sacrifice.112 
 
Of course, this rule focuses on the treatment disparity between those with 
some disability and those without either that disability or any disability at 
all.  However, it is now widely understood that disability discrimination can 
occur even without a comparator class.113  Put another way, some forms of 
discrimination (institutionalization specifically) can occur regardless of how 
anyone else is treated.114 
Finally, understanding that our State Constitution was intended to draw 
on other sources of law for its interpretation;115 and understanding that the 
wisdom of other courts and legislatures can help us interpret what “equal 
protection” means for purposes of disability discrimination under the Loui-
siana Constitution,116 I note that every single state has either a policy or law 
favoring de-institutionalization or integration of persons with disabilities.117 
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, our Louisiana Constitution prohib-
its institutionalization and favors integration under its three Equal Protection 
Clauses in this way.  First, article I, section 3 prohibits laws (and as originally 
understood government action) that would deny integration of persons with 
disabilities or cause institutionalization.  Second, article I, section 12 prohib-
its government actors and private business from failing to integrate persons 
with disabilities in places of public access (and thus may require, in appro-
priate circumstances, community placement by the state in order for there to 
ever be a chance of access to these places).  Finally, article I, section 2’s Due 
Process Clause would likewise prohibit the government from 
 
 112. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601. 
 113. Amundson ex rel. Amundson v. Wis. Dep’t of Health Serv., 721 F. 3d 871, 874 (7th Cir. 
2013) (overruling prior precedent, acknowledging there is no longer any need to show a comparison 
to others outside the protected class, recognizing the Olmstead rule that “undue institutionalization 
of disabled persons” constitutes discrimination “no matter how anyone else is treated,” and recog-
nizing that other circuits had done the same) (citing Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597–603). 
 114. Amundson ex rel. Amundson, 721 F. 3d at 874. 
 115. Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume I 10th Day, supra note 46, at 80. 
 116. The Louisiana Supreme Court has already done so in other contexts, in fact.  State v. 
Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 756 (La. 1992). 
 117. Brief for Petitioners at 49 1a, Appendix A, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (listing such policies or laws in every state). 
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institutionalizing persons with disabilities.118 
Accepting that our State Constitution contains a prohibition on institu-
tionalization of persons with disabilities, it remains to be seen what limits 
exist on that rule.  In other words, while there is a right to community treat-
ment under the Louisiana Constitution, one must still ask what limits are 
placed on that right.  As noted above, the limit is simple: the right can be 
denied if to do so substantially furthers an important government interest.  
While one could philosophize to infinity about what is or is not an important 
government interest, the United States Supreme Court has already handed us 
a very good guide as to what important government interests may be at issue 
here.  To this, Justice Ginsburg wrote that community placement (i.e., de-
institutionalization) is appropriate: 
 
 . . . when the State's treatment professionals have deter-
mined that community placement is appropriate, the transfer 
from institutional care to a less restrictive setting is not op-
posed by the affected individual, and the placement can be 
reasonably accommodated, taking into account the re-
sources available to the State and the needs of others with 
mental disabilities.119 
 
The need for expert decision-making substantially furthers the State’s 
interest in insuring that persons with disabilities receive appropriate care.  
The requirement that the transfer is not opposed by the affected individual 
substantially furthers the important interest in protecting the wishes and de-
cision making of individuals.  The “reasonably accommodated” requirement 
that takes into account the resources of the state and the needs of others sub-
stantially furthers the important interest in maintaining adequate and appro-
priate services for others with disabilities.  Therefore, the Louisiana Consti-
tution’s prohibition on institutionalization is more aptly called a prohibition 
on unjustified institutionalization. 
 
VII. Responses to Objections 
 
This part considers certain ancillary issues that arose during the research 
and writing of this article.  Special gratitude is given here to Dean Meyer of 
Tulane Law School who proposed a number of these issues to me during our 
discussions regarding this article.  
 
 118. Substantive Due Process may, apart from its equal protection component, prohibit unjus-
tified institutionalization as well.  For a discussion on State Constitutional rights to integration, see 
Anthony B. Klapper, Finding a Right in State Constitutions for Community Treatment of the Men-
tally Ill, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 739 (1993). 
 119. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587. 
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First, as shown above, the idea that the Constitution of Louisiana con-
tains these various theories of disability discrimination appears to be quite 
clear.  The question this prompts is why the framers of the Louisiana Con-
stitution did not expressly say that these theories were part of the Constitu-
tion and not leave their discovery to future generations.  The response to this 
objection is that, in writing the Constitution, the framers wanted to keep it as 
short as possible and wanted the courts, scholars, and lawyers to help develop 
its content through argument and research.  This last point is not mere con-
jecture or an observation that I think should be made—the framers of our 
Louisiana Constitution expressly said as such themselves.120 
A second objection to my theory is that these rights I discuss appear to 
be unwritten.  If they are unwritten, what clause should be said to protect 
them, or what cause of action is there for these rights to be enforced?  The 
answer to this objection is that these are not unwritten rights in the traditional 
sense.  Rather, they are simply reasonable constructions of the state’s various 
Equal Protection Clauses.  Thus, these rights are enforceable just as those 
other clauses are.  Second, rights of the Louisiana Constitution are said to be 
self-executing.121  Thus, there would be no need for additional legislation for 
the theories of this article to be enforced.  Third, it may be argued as an 
interpretive matter that our article I, section 24, which resembles the federal 
Ninth Amendment, ought to be construed as a cause of action in the event 
that the above rights require an independent cause of action.122  Fourth and 
finally, like all constitutional rights, these rights can be asserted as a defense 
in criminal or civil proceedings. 
Another objection was that it seems odd that persons with disabilities 
should have these various extra theories of discrimination, even though the 
clauses of the Constitution that contain the “physical condition” or “disabil-
ity” classification are the same ones that contain the various other protected 
classifications.123  There are two answers to this objection.  First, the very 
nature and history of disability discrimination means that it is perfectly rea-
sonable that those with disabilities should have these additional theories of 
 
 120. Constitutional Convention Transcripts volume I 10th Day, supra note 46, at 80. 
 121. John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 54 LA. L. REV. 683, 730–31 (1994). 
 122. That clause states, “The enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not deny 
or disparage other rights retained by the individual citizens of the state.”  U.S. CONST. AMEND. IX.  
See e.g., Derek Warden, The Ninth Cause: Using the Ninth Amendment as a Cause of Action to 
Cure Incongruences in Current Civil Rights Litigation, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 403 (2018).  Another 
potential area for a “cause of action” similar to the Ninth Amendment argument I have made else-
where is from article I, section 22 of the Louisiana Constitution, which reads like its own cause of 
action in part: “All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due 
process of law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury 
to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights.”  LA. CONST. art. I, § 22.  Though Loui-
siana courts have tended to foreclose that path.  Sons v. Inland, Marine Service, Inc., 577 So. 2d 
225, 230 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991). 
 123. See supra notes 29 and 30 (listing the characteristics protected by these clauses). 
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protection and the others do not.  For example, persons with disabilities often 
require accommodations to truly enjoy equality within society; whereas an 
accommodation to someone’s race is not necessarily needed for individuals 
to enjoy equality.  Second, the framers of the Louisiana Constitution were 
well aware of other federal laws that prohibited discrimination on the basis 
of various characteristics.  One primary example of such laws is Title VII, 
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of numerous characteristics.  
Some classifications under Title VII have theories and rights not found in the 
others.124 
A fourth objection was lodged against my article as follows: the Consti-
tution prohibits discrimination on the basis of “physical condition;” thus, by 
saying that persons with disabilities have these various other rights protec-
tions, are we not thereby discriminating on the basis of “physical condition?”  
In other words, those with physical impairments have these rights discussed 
above, while those without impairments do not.  There are two answers to 
this objection.  First, physical condition discrimination is allowed where 
such substantially furthers an important government interest.  Allowing in-
dividuals with disabilities to have these theories at their disposal would no 
doubt substantially further the government’s compelling and overriding in-
terest in curing the harm that years of discrimination that persons with disa-
bilities faced throughout history and would also substantially further the 
compelling or overriding interest in protecting those with disabilities from 
the social stigma associated with their conditions.125  Second, Constitutions 
can have two seemingly contradictory parts.126  Here, while true there is a 
general prohibition on physical condition discrimination, the Constitution 
also has these specific rights for those with disabilities.  Thus, the latter 
would control.  In other words, what would otherwise be unconstitutional, 
the Constitution can make constitutional.  
A fifth objection came in the following form: some of my argument fo-
cuses on the need to create various causes of action for disability plaintiffs 
as opposed to other “physical condition” types of discrimination.  However, 
this would mean that the same words of the same clauses have two compo-
nents.  The response to this objection is that we have seen time and again 
that in constitutional law, the same clauses can have two separate and at 
 
 124. For example, there is a right to accommodation for religion but not others under Title VII.  
Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333 (1970); see also, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2028 (2015). 
 125. Warden, supra note 72, at 91 (noting compelling and overriding nature of interest to pre-
vent disability discrimination in light of history of disability discrimination). 
 126. Just as Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is contradictory to the Eleventh Amend-
ment to the Constitution, though there is room for both in constitutional jurisprudence, and both are 
still valid parts of the Constitution.  See U.S. v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) (discussing how the 
two clauses relate to one another). 
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times diametrically opposed components.127 
A sixth objection came in this form: I have argued that article I, section 
3 and article I, section 12, and the Due Process Clause all combine to prohibit 
disability discrimination generally—section 3 as to laws, section 12 as to 
persons who discriminate (private or public), and Due Process as to both 
(except private conduct).  This argument thus means that the Due Process 
Clause can duplicate the work done by the other clause.  This would mean 
that the clause is superfluous, and because superfluity must be avoided, so 
too should my interpretation.   
There are three responses to this objection.  First, that two clauses can, 
on occasion, do the same thing does not mean that they are superfluous.  Sub-
stantive Due Process and Equal Protection are notorious for requiring the 
same result in the same cases—most notable in the canonical Loving v. Vir-
ginia.128  Second, the rule against superfluity is, much like other rules under 
stare decisis, not a hard and fast rule.  There are many reasons why additional 
and seemingly superfluous clauses are added.  For example, it is now known 
that, for the Louisiana Constitution, the framers added the Equal Protection 
Clauses in order to help illuminate the equal protection rules that seemingly 
would have applied under an Equal Protection Due Process theory.129  In-
deed, take for example, the death penalty issue above.  It is difficult to see 
how article I, section 12, which discusses access to public areas, would apply 
in that situation.  However, the Due Process Clause’s Equal Protection com-
ponent, illuminated by the terms and statements surrounding section 12 and 
section 3, shows that disparate impact is a valid Substantive Due Process 
Equal Protection claim for those with disabilities against public entities gen-
erally.  Third, and finally, it is now well established that plaintiffs may have 
multiple avenues of relief, even under the same act, and especially in the 
disability rights arena.130 
A seventh objection was this: the forms of discrimination that I am dis-
cussing seem to include “intra-class” discrimination.  In other words, it ap-
pears that disability discrimination need not contain a comparator class at all.  
My response to this, as noted above, is that “disability discrimination” has 
now long been regarded as not requiring a comparator class—i.e., actions 
can count as disability discrimination regardless of how anyone else is 
 
 127. See e.g., Jamal Green, The Meming of Substantive Due Process, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 
253 (2016) (discussing “substantive due process” and “procedural due process” even though they 
come from the same two words “due process”). 
 128. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 129. See Hargrave, supra note 31, at 7 (after discussing the confusing history of Due Process 
and Equal Protection, stated, “[R]ather than leaving the development of the forbidden classifica-
tions solely to the courts, the choice was made to list a number of discriminatory bases which are 
prohibited . . . [and] instead of depending on the legal construction of terms of art.”). 
 130. Currie v. Group. Ins. Comm’n., 290 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 2002) (specifically discussing 
the ADA). 
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treated.131  This concept is well entrenched in disability discrimination theory 
and practice.  For example, failure to make buildings physically accessible 
counts as disability discrimination, even though only those with physical im-
pairments feel the discriminatory effects—not those with other disabilities.  
The eighth and final objection was this: the theories proposed in this ar-
ticle are effectively the exact same as those already protected under some 
state law and federal law; therefore, what is the point of finding these rights 
in the Louisiana Constitution?  There are a number of responses to this ob-
jection.  First, states are free to enact their own legislation that expressly 
tracks or expands upon federal disability rights laws.132  Second, having these 
theories as a state law matter would allow our courts to decide issues on state 
law alone, thereby at times avoiding additional expensive litigation through 
the various federal courts or the Supreme Court.  Third, as evident in the 
disparate impact arena, due to the nature of the Louisiana Constitution using 
intermediate scrutiny for disability claims, the rights protected under the 
Louisiana Constitution can be different than those protected under federal 
law.  Fourth, Title II of the ADA (applicable to government entities) is often 
times limited to public services, programs, or activities that are styled as 
“out-puts” and not “in-puts.”133  This distinction has led to confusing nit-
picking in federal litigation.  The Louisiana Constitution’s prohibitions de-
scribed in this article would apply bar none to the state and, as such, there 
would be no need to determine whether the conduct was an “in-put” or an 
“out-put.”  Third, the Rehabilitation Act is limited to those entities that re-
ceive federal financial assistance.134  Not every state agency receives federal 
financial assistance.  Thus, while those agencies would be free from restraint 
under the Rehabilitation Act, they would be bound by the Louisiana Consti-
tution.  Fourth and finally, the State of Louisiana has some sovereign im-
munity left against federal anti-discrimination laws,135 but has waived that 
 
 131. Amundson ex rel., 721 F. 3d at 874 (7th Cir. 2013).  Of course, this does not mean that 
every law that touches on disabilities will necessarily fail constitutional muster.  There must always 
be some causal connection between the discrimination and the disability or condition.  Discrimina-
tion based simply on where one developed the same disability or condition would not count for 
purposes of disability discrimination.  The general concept of workers’ compensation is a good 
example of this.  Individuals who develop a disability at work can obtain workers’ compensation 
benefits, while individuals who develop the same disability unrelated to work generally cannot.  
However, I do not mean to suggest that all workers’ compensation laws will always pass constitu-
tional muster for every potential plaintiff.  The state cannot be allowed to hide disability discrimi-
nation in the guise of workers’ compensation. Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court has already 
struck down a provision of workers’ compensation law under the age provision of article I § 3. 
Pierce v. Lafource Parish Council, 762 So. 2d 608 (La. 2000). 
 132. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b). 
 133. Derek Warden, Four Pathways of Undermining Board of Trustees of the University of 
Alabama v. Garrett, 42 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555, 572–74 (2020). 
 134. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
 135. For example, they still have sovereign immunity from most disability-based employment 
claims under Title I of the ADA.  Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 531 U.S. at 356 (2001). 
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immunity for many state law claims—potentially those types of claims dis-




This article has shown the Louisiana Constitution contains three Equal 
Protection Clauses.  The first is found in article I, section 2, the Due Process 
Clause, which has a “substantive component” that contains an equal protec-
tion component.  This clause is active against government generally.  The 
second is found in article I, section 3 and prohibits discrimination by laws.  
While, in relation to those with disabilities specifically, the clause was orig-
inally intended to apply to both laws and conduct, state courts have tended 
to say it applies to laws.  The third is in article I, section 12 and prohibits 
discrimination in access to public places.  This applies to governments and 
private entities alike.  All three clauses are interpreted together.  As shown 
in this article—and based on statements from the framing of the Louisiana 
Constitution—they each prohibit disability discrimination unless the con-
duct can be said to substantially further an important interest.  This broad 
anti-discrimination prohibition includes: a prohibition on disparate treat-
ment; a prohibition on the failure to reasonably accommodate or make rea-
sonable modifications; a prohibition on neutral acts that have a disparate im-
pact on those with disabilities; and an integration requirement, which 
includes a right to be free from unjustified institutionalization.  
These requirements may appear differently depending on the circum-
stances.  For example, they prohibit the imposition of certain fees.  They 
would also prohibit public or private institutions (including schools, hospi-
tals, and other establishments) from failing to make reasonable accommoda-
tions or modifications—such as where schools or hospitals deny admission 
to those with disabilities due to physical inaccessibility.  Identifying a right 
to be free from disparate impact of otherwise neutral laws may also impact 
the criminal justice system insofar as persons with disabilities are concerned. 
Finally, in recognizing these broad theories of disability discrimina-
tion—disparate treatment; disparate impact; reasonable accommodation, 
modification, and alterations; and integration or unjustified institutionaliza-
tion—the Louisiana Constitution has recognized the principles that mental 
illness is not mental fault, physical disability is not physical fault, and devel-
opmental disability is not developmental fault.  It is time our Louisiana 
courts recognize the same principles. 
 
 
 136. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10. 
